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Introduction
On the brink of a ‘long second decade’ in the 
twenty-first century, the major emerging economies 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) together with 
the ‘Next-Eleven’1 (N11)—as identified by Goldman 
Sachs (2007a; 2007b)— stand out as new nodes of 
influence in a multipolar world. African countries may 
be absent among the BRICs and limited among the 
N11 (Nigeria and Egypt—and not including South 
Africa), but the economic future of the continent 
appears increasingly bound to this global shift. 
Brazil and South Africa seem to possess a capacity to 
contribute to the production of international order 
and share a common belief in their entitlement for 
a more influential role in international affairs. In 
addition, both countries can be differentiated from 
other second-tier states and middle-sized powers. 
John Ikenberry has argued powerfully that one of the 
most important characteristics of the international 
system in the second half of the twentieth century 
was the emergence of a US-led order built around 
the institutional and multilateral structures created 
in the wake of the Second World War (the UN, 
GATT, the international financial institutions) and 
the extraordinarily dense set of transatlantic and 
trans-Pacific relations and alliance systems. Unlike 
Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and the major 
European countries (as a bloc and individually), 
they are not closely integrated in an alliance system 
with the United States. Many initiatives of the Lula 
administration are situated in the framework of 
international trade negotiations and the search for 
deepening political coordination with emerging 
countries, namely India, South Africa, Russia and 
China. Most of these partnerships began taking shape 
towards the end of the Cardoso administration, but 
Lula gave a new emphasis to this aspect of Brazil’s 
international agenda. South Africa’s ambitions 
to play a leadership role in Africa, bolstered by its 
preponderance of economic power and recognised 
internationally political stature in the continent, 
have contributed to an unprecedented restructuring 
of the regional economic and political architecture. 
Employing techniques as varied as institution 
building and moral suasion, the post-apartheid 
government has promoted new regional structures 
and processes and, concurrently, a revivalist form 
of the pan-Africanist ideology. Coupled to South 
African capital, whose outreach into the continent 
has fuelled both growth and controversy, Pretoria has 
begun to reshape Africa’s economic landscape and, 
to a certain extent, its political landscape. In spite of 
these achievements, it is clear that the ability of the 
South African government to act decisively in the 
name of African interests is more accepted in global 
settings like the G8 or WTO than is always the case 
within Africa. 
This article will examine two of the world’s 
emerging middle powers Brazil and South Africa, the 
rise and promulgation of their cooperative strategies 
to reform institutions such as the United Nations 
Security Council. The article tries to examine the 
instrumental nature of South African and Brazilian 
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foreign policy within the framework of both countries’ 
commitment to multilateralism and if this has been 
rising as part of a new form of shallow multilateralism 
or a regenerated regionalism of the South. Moreover, 
with regards to recent crises in Honduras and 
Zimbabwe, we will try to offer a critical evaluation 
of both countries global standing and their effort 
to promote democratic values in regional and sub-
regional levels. 
 
Changes in Global Governance and the 
emergence of Middle Powers 
 
Recent changes in the international order are 
beginning to make inroads into theoretical debates. 
With them goes a rediscovery of the concept of 
power in international relations. Several analysts have 
downplayed insights of the institutionalist belief which 
leads into a progressive legalization of international 
relations and a constructivist emphasis on the 
discursive process of social learning, norm diffusion 
and the constitutive capacity of institutions as driving 
forced of constantly deepening multi-layered system 
of global governance.1
Forman and Segaar underlined that there is a 
growing trend to perceive the international system 
as hierarchical by taking account of the ranging 
distribution of power in different issues.2 As noted 
before, beyond the efforts to institutionalize 
reforms into the international organizations there 
are numerable attempts to change the way the 
international community does the world’s business.3 
The changing nature and function of the international 
institutions must be attributed at least to two major 
factors. One is the rise of powers such as China, 
India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa the countries 
benefited more from globalization. The second factor 
is closely linked with the reluctance of the Northern 
developed countries to agree into adjustments of the 
international institutional architecture. 
Middle power is a term used in the international 
relations theory in order to describe states that do 
not have great power status, but nevertheless, have 
international relations influence. Keohane defines 
middle powers as states whose leaders consider that 
they cannot act alone effectively but may be able to 
have a systemic impact in a small group of states or 
international institution.4 From the perspective of a 
materialist account of states and power set within 
the framework of the international system, middle 
powers are better understood to be committed 
multilateralists as means of overcoming their material 
deficiency in terms of structural power. Nevertheless, 
debates about that classification of states as middle 
power can obscure the category. Cooper has stated 
that middle power behiavour can be better described 
as that of a catalyst to promote global issues or a 
facilitator to build coalitions. Middle powers are 
engaged in followership and leadership behaviour in 
order to response in relative changes to the status of 
hegemonic powers.5 However, the grouping of states 
as diverse as Brazil and Canada, or South Africa and 
Sweden together raises the issue of the usefulness of 
the middle-power concept and risks undermining the 
concept’s analytical power. Many analysts have met 
problem in order to identify middle powers. Higgot 
and Nosal propose as a solution to identify middle 
powers by their foreign policy behaviour; that is, 
their proclivity for seeking multilateral solutions to 
international problems, for advocating compromise 
and for, in general, being part of the solution to 
problems at international level. David Black has 
1  RULAND Jurgen, BECHLE Karsten (2010): Interregionalism without regions: IBSA as a form of shallow multilateralism 
(to be published), pp. 158.
2  FORMAN, S and SEGAAR, D. (2006): New Coalitions for Global Governance: the Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism, 
Global Governance Vol. 12, Number 2, 2003, pp 205-25.
3  Ibid. 
4  KEOHANE, R and MARTIN, L. (1995): The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, in: International Security, Vol 19 Number 
1, pp. 39-51. 
5  COOPER, A, HIGGOTT, R & NOSSAL, K, (1993), Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada World Order, 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp. 24-25. 




pointed to an unavoidably tautological element in the 
identification of middle powers; namely, that middle 
powers are identified by their foreign policy behaviour, 
which leads to the identification of similarities in 
the constitutive features of middle-power states, 
from whence the circle is completed by explaining 
middle-power foreign policy as shaped by these 
compositional features. 
However, there seems to be a differentiation in 
the category of middle power states into classic middle 
powers and emerging middle powers. Traditional 
middle powers are stable social democracies, whereas 
democracy in emerging middle powers is often far 
from consolidated, and in many cases only recently 
established. Traditional middle powers qua middle 
powers came to prominence during the Cold War. The 
insecure positions of smaller states powerlessly caught 
in the standoff between the two superpowers resulted 
in a foreign policy highly concerned with military 
and political issues. On the other hand, in emerging 
middle powers democracy often stands superimposed 
onto a society with deep social cleavages, whether 
in terms of class in Brazil or ethnicity in South 
Africa the popular contestation of these cleavages 
having been placed largely beyond the scope of 
polyarchical democracy. Furthermore, democracy 
in some emerging middle powers often seems of a 
poorer quality than that found in traditional middle 
powers, considering, for example, commonplace 
human rights abuses in Nigeria, Malaysia and Turkey 
and one-party domination in countries like South 
Africa and Malaysia. 
Emerging middle powers rose to assume their 
internationalist postures after the Cold War. The 
bygone insecurities of the Cold War meant the 
reduction of military and strategic concerns in foreign 
policy and a concomitant increased importance for 
economic matters. In addition, emerging middle 
powers are semi-peripheral, the middle-income 
status of emerging middle powers, coupled with 
great income inequality, suggests that elites in 
these states are very well integrated into the world 
economy, with the parallel existence of huge pockets 
of ‘internal South’. Furthermore, Emerging middle 
powers are eager, and often leading, participants in 
regional structures. In Africa, South Africa and Nigeria 
dominate their respective regions economically. In 
South America, Brazil has the largest economy and 
Argentina the most developed economy. South 
Africa’s trade surplus within both the Southern African 
Development Community and in the wider African 
market compensates for its trade deficit with the 
rest of the world. Dictated by their semi-peripheral 
status, compared with the core position of traditional 
middle powers in the global economy, emerging 
middle powers favour greater reform to global 
economic rules and structures. However, the reform 
preferred by emerging middle powers is reformist 
and not fundamental, given that semi-peripheral 
economies still hold a competitive advantage over 
peripheral states, especially over those in their 
immediate geographical vicinity. In this regard, Brazil 
has embraced the sub regional project embodied in 
MERCOSUR, while resisting hemispheric integration 
for fear of its powerful position being usurped by the 
United States. 
However, middle power internationalism is 
not strictly defined by complex of dominant values, 
social forces and institutions embedded in their own 
society complexes as well as state-societal abilities 
in terms of diplomatic capacity and skill. A way of 
contrasting the internationalism of these two groups 
of middle powers is viewing the emerging middle-
power orientation as ‘reformist’, whereas that of the 
traditional middle powers is ‘appeasing’, as shaped 
by their different positions in the global political 
economy. Emerging middle powers, which assumed 
their middle-power roles largely in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, focus more strongly on their immediate 
regions than do traditional middle powers by, for 
example, assuming the lead in processes of regional 
integration, the same which cannot generally be 
said of traditional middle powers. In some cases, the 
hegemon even welcomes opposition from emerging 
middle powers, as the hegemon can later draw on this 
semblance of emerging middle-power independence 
to assist in legitimising the hegemonic project with 
regard to other issues. Ironically, by performing typical 
middle power tasks, emerging middle powers seek to 
construct an identity more removed from the regions 




that give them their relative international visibility and 
influence. This tendency is noticeable in the example 
of South Africa and Brazil seeking debt relief for other 
Southern African and South American states, but 
not for themselves. A reason for this distance from 
other neighbouring states becomes apparent if one 
considers, for example, the negative effect the recent 
faltering of democracy and civil order in Zimbabwe 
has had on the South African currency, currency 
values often being determined more by perception 
than reality. 
 
Towards the era of shallow multilateralism 
 
Where institutions have become arenas for 
power struggles over norms, rules, decision making 
and membership issues balancing moves tend to 
dominate. This means that states form institutional 
alignments or coalitions in order to prevent other 
states from realizing their policy objectives. As power 
configurations are usually dynamic and change 
frequently, states are not much interested in investing 
in institutional strengthening. 
Intergovernmental initiatives have developed 
over the past decades in response to a perceived 
lack of effectiveness of existing multilateral 
institutions, notably the United Nations in dealing 
with transnational and global problems. Shallow 
multilateralism is a form of multilateralism where 
only the institutional shell remains, but where the 
normative substance was lost.6 Hard law is declining 
towards soft law. A growing number of actors and 
the complexity of matters, become increasingly 
difficult to reach binding, precise and enforceable 
agreements. Soft law suits the interests of many actors 
in multilateral institutions as it keeps commitment 
low and thus allows for swift and opportunistic 
responses to changing power equations and new 
policy issues. Within this framework and institutional 
environment the two partners of the IBSA (India-
Brazil-South Africa) partnership have repeatedly 
declared their intention to transform globalization 
into a process with a human face. Their thrust for a 
socially more equitable process of globalization entails 
a vocal opposition against any neoliberal agendas, 
nevertheless, this article will not explore further the 
impact of this rising powers against established 
Western powers. While the IBSA partnership 
between India Brazil and South Africa fits well into 
the concept of shallow multilateralism, the exclusive 
Brazil-South Africa partnership can be depicted as a 
form of interregionalism.7 Interregionalism in a wider 
sense includes the continental dialogues between 
two regional powers representing a regional group 
(MERCOSUR and SADC) or without representing the 
group, given their status the regional powers can act 
as continental superpowers. However, why the Brazil 
South Africa cooperation is exclusive and why we did 
not include India in our analysis? 
To begin with, after the 50TH General Assembly of 
the United Nations in New York in 2003, where India, 
Brazil and South Africa deployed a wide range of 
activities to lend substance to the trilateral cooperation 
and soon after the Brazilian Summit Declaration in 
2006, the Brazilian President Ignacio Luis da Silva 
“Lula” and his South African counterpart Thabo Mbeki 
reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion of 
peace, security and human rights. Second, Brazil and 
South Africa have common standpoints regarding 
non-proliferation and disarmament, quite the contrary 
India was the only one from the partnership who 
enriched its nuclear arsenal. In addition, Brazil and 
South Africa are interested in avoiding the extension of 
national crises in their regions as democratic stability is 
a precondition for the economic development for their 
regions.8 On the contrary to India-Pakistan hostility, 
Brazil and South Africa have not involved in armed 
conflicts and any regional dispute. Third, Brazil and 
6  CUTS (2006) South-South Economic Cooperation: Exploring the IBSA Initiative, Advocacy Document, Jaipur, CUTS. 
7  RULAND Jurgen, BECHLE Karsten (2010): Interregionalism without regions: IBSA as a form of shallow multilateralism 
(to be published), pp 158.
8  FLEMES, D (2007) Emerging Middle Powers, Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum, GIGA Working Papers No. 57, Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies.




South Africa view regional power bases in the form 
of integration schemes such as the South African 
Development Community and the African Union or 
MERCOSUR and the Union of South American Nations 
(UNISAR) as pivotal to their global ambitions. 
 
The Interregional Partners 
 
Brazil 
Brazil’s position of dominance in South America 
is a product if its geography, population and economic 
status as well as of its military capacity has shaped its 
sense of distinctiveness from the rest of the region. 
Brazilian foreign policy has involved historically 
around an axis of diplomacy which represents the 
relations within relatively equal states in South 
America. In order to overcome its relative weakness 
within the international system, Brazil has utilized 
multilateralism as means of enhancing its status 
as a global player. Our concern here is not a 
detailed analysis of Brazilian foreign policy but the 
substance and change that President Lula gave to 
its nature. Despite the fact that Lula government 
has adopted an orthodox macroeconomic recipe, 
quite one resembling the Cardoso policies, in the 
foreign affairs moved significantly towards a more 
autonomy-focused strategy.9 During President Lula’s 
first government (2002–2006), these apparently 
contradictory objectives—a conservative economic 
agenda and an increasingly developmentalist foreign 
policy—were stretched to their limits, without 
amounting to a definitive break. The potential 
particularity of Brazilian foreign policy is what Marco 
Antonio Vieira called “pragmatic resilience”.10 In this 
concept Lula has utilized a new set of cooperative 
arrangements between Middle Power states, which 
pooled together their material and principal assets to 
achieve clear national interests. Brazil’s commitment 
and active involvement in multilateral institutions has 
been constant since the end of the nineteenth century. 
Brazil sought to raise the profile of its activities in the 
political realm and in trade negotiations, attempting 
to counter its conservative position through 
diplomatic activism in areas that the Cardoso did not 
insist upon. A more straightforward position backing 
UN system reform—especially the enlargement of 
the Security Council, to which Brazil placed its own 
candidacy—was also taken. The apparent changes 
in the Lula administration had some guidelines: 1) to 
contribute to the search for greater equilibrium and to 
attenuate unilateralism; 2) to strengthen bilateral and 
multilateral relations in order to increase the country’s 
weight in political and economic negotiations on an 
international level; 3) to deepen relations so as to 
benefit from possibly greater economic, financial, 
technological and cultural exchanges. these guidelines 
implied precise emphases: 1) an intensification of 
relations with emerging countries such as India, 
China, Russia and South Africa; 2) an important role 
at the Doha Round of the WTO, as was the case in 
other international negotiations and campaigning 
for the reform of the UN Security Council, including 
a permanent seat for Brazil. 
Over the past years the United Nations has faced 
increasing pressures for institutional reform and 
for democratization of its decision making process. 
After the end of the Cold War, Brazil supported the 
enforcement of multilateral institutions, particularly 
the expansion of the UN peacekeeping operations. 
Regarding the UN reinforcement, Brazil had pursued 
an agenda of three core principles involving around 
the strengthening of the multilateral norms, the need 
to reestablish the frontier between peacekeeping and 
peacenforcement and the process of the decision 
making within the United Nations Security Council. 
The latter goal has been one of the key priorities of 
the Lula administration, who insisted on the need to 
give substance internationally to democratic values. 
Finally, Brazil has expressed its special concern at 
the definition of coercive actions under the Chapter 
VII and has strongly defended the principle of non 
interventionism and pacific resolution of disputes. 
9  THE ECONOMIST (2009), November 14.
10  ALDEN, C and VIEIRA, M. A (2005): The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism, 
in: Third World Quarterly 26, no.7, pp. 1077-1095. 




Nevertheless, Lula’s foreign policy making has been 
involved around a complex decision making process 
into which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers 
South America should placed on top of the foreign 
policy agenda and on the other hand, the Lula team 
have been more active in interregional politics. 
Meanwhile Lula is supportive of the view that Brazil 
should expand its responsibility for the maintenance 
of political stability on South America through 
the promotion of stronger democratic norms and 
institutions. 
Since 2003, Brazil has interfered in crises in 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Haiti. Whereas in the first 
two, Brazil seek to find a political viable solution, in 
Haiti led one of the most emergent UN peacekeeping 
operations (MINUSTAH). Lula’s foreign policy, seeking 
to increase its international and regional status, has 
taken on a pre-eminent role in Haiti. Here the country 
has accepted the command of a UN Special Mission 
to establish peace in Haiti by sending a contingent 
of some 1200 soldiers. Even in this situation, we 
cannot identify an action that implies goal changes 
in relation to the country’s traditional foreign policy, 
but there may be a change from the autonomy 
through- distance period. The sending of troops to 
Haiti is part of Brazil’s tradition, taking into account 
the country’s peacekeeping role back in 1956, under 
President Kubitschek, when it sent forces to Sinai, 
having followed through in Angola and other smaller 
countries (Yugoslavia and East Timor). The presence 
in Haiti, approved in 2003, is linked to the tradition 
of Brazilian diplomacy of co-operating in policies 
that seek to promote international (Sinai) or national 
(Angola) peace. In Venezuela, Brazil tried to settle the 
Chavez-opposition differences under a democratic 
framework and in Bolivia along with Argentina 
mediated the Losada-Menza talks. In Haiti, the 
MINUSTAH operation was involved around reforming 
Haitian national police, assisting the transitional 
government in disarmament and reintegration 
programmes. Moreover, Brazil has launched a Middle 
East Initiative and President Lula has visited Syria, 
Lebanon, Libya and United Arab Emirates. In addition, 
within the IBSA framework, Brazil and its partners 
condemned the extensive use of force in the 2006 
Summer War in Lebanon and the destruction of the 
country’s infrastructure. 
Finally and most recently, after the military coup 
in Honduras, the exiled President Manuel Zelaya seek 
asylum in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. The 
Honduras coup touched a sensitive nerve in Brasilia, 
where given its long battled military rule, Lula was in 
mood to consider any ambiguity in that case. The de 
facto President Roberto Michelleti rejected the plan 
backed by the OAS (Organization of American States) 
and endorsed by Brazil under which Zelaya would 
serve the rest of its tenure until January.11 Brasilia 
granted asylum to Zelaya which means that under 
the Vienna Convention, the Honduran ex President 
should abstain from any political declaration. 
The Lula administration has been following in 
this case its doctrine of pragmatic resilience, having 
strongly support multilateral institutional solutions 
and abstaining from taking a concrete stance which 
could take off Brazil’s image as a power broker.12
 
South Africa 
South Africa is regarded as an emerging power, 
the key defining characteristic of which is the 
aspiration to play a dynamic and constructive role 
beyond its borders. In order to play that role, a secure 
domestic base, a sizable economic capability and a 
decent enabling environment is required. Although 
originally democratic socialist in orientation, the 
ANC shifted its policy upon taking office to embrace 
a neoliberal agenda that put emphasis on opening 
markets. 
Given the lack of smaller governments of effective 
hard power and soft power resources in order to 
protect themselves from the detritus of civil wars, 
poverty, crime, smuggling, trafficking etc, South 
Africa, under Thabo Mbeki grew increasingly confident 
in its position as the dominant player in Southern 
Africa and wider African region.13 In addition, despite 
11  TIME MAGAZINE, Brazil Reluctantly Takes Key Role in Honduras Dispute, September. 30, 2009 
12  ARNSON, C. Weak Institutions and the Honduras Crisis, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 2009.




the combination of adverse circumstances both in 
southern African region and Africa which complicates 
Pretoria’s attempt to foster a constructive role, South 
Africa is perceived a the hegemonic power in Africa 
by Western powers. 
South African foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki 
had a central role in reconstructing the former 
Organization of African Unity into the African Union 
and the launch of the New Economic Policy for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) which both initiatives helped 
underway for Africa’s building of liberal governance.14 
In theory NEPAD and AU symbolized a new African 
premise build on good governance, human rights 
and rejection of authoritarian norms. Supported by 
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, originally 
an Mbeki brainchild and product of the so-called 
African Renaissance, the NEPAD supported African 
solutions to Africa’s problems. In reality however as 
we shall see, in the most enduring crisis in Southern 
Africa region in Zimbabwe, South Africa’s policy have 
been contradicting. Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policy must 
be seen its historical context.15 The country’s foreign 
policy makers felt that South Africa has been humbled 
in its previous intervention attempts under Nelson 
Mandela. The Nigerian episode in 1995 regarding the 
condemnation of the Ogoni in Niger Delta and the 
intra-SADC acrimony in Democratic Republic of Congo 
in 1998, where South Africa sought a diplomatic 
solution to the problem and Namibia, Zimbabwe and 
Angola assisted Laurent Kabila. Within this context 
Mbeki viewed the Zimbabwe crisis as regional problem 
and his professed willingness to mediate the crisis 
rather than overtly to condemn Robert Mugabe was 
a part of a mindset of presenting South Africa as a 
regional hegemon. Nonetheless, the view which was 
held widely was that South Africa is a hegemonic 
power with the means to influence outcomes in 
Zimbabwe and elsewhere wider in the region. On 
the other hand many commentators have argued, 
stating that South Africa’s view as a hegemonic 
power was exaggerated. According to Newman and 
Evans a hegemon’s ability to lead is derived as much 
from what it stands for as how it seeks to achieve its 
goals.16 With regards to the South African foreign 
policy under Mbeki, this has created a fundamental 
contradiction on the one hand South Africa seemed 
to promoting multilateral institutions as well as its role 
in the formation of NEPAD and AU, while on the other 
hand many felt that the policy towards Zimbabwe 
should more outspoken. 
The crisis in Zimbabwe after the elections of 
2008, where the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) disputed the outcome and charged the 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) for making an electoral fraud using 
violence. The SADC couched the crisis as a political 
battle between Pan-Africanism and neocolonialism, 
nevertheless, adopted a more partisan posture as the 
election crisis of 2008 unfolded. However, from many 
points of view the SADC remains loyal to the ZANU-
PF and failed to condemn overtly Robert Mugabe for 
unleashing an orchestrated campaign of violence or 
the electoral irregularities.17 The SADC has ignored 
its own verdict of observer mission and soon after 
the negotiating deadlock of the power sharing talks 
conducted under the SADC framework; it supported 
a solution under which the ZANU-PF retained control 
of central security ministries.18
In his approach to Zimbabwe crisis, Mbeki was 
guided by South Africa’s own experience in conflict 
resolution and mediation and his doctrine of “helping 
Africans duplicate South Africa’s model of power-
sharing and reconciliation”. In trying to export the 
South African model in Zimbabwe, Mbeki overlooked 
the peculiar nature of the country, with Zimbabwe 
being the world’s fastest shrinking economy between 
13  DOWDEN R. (2005) We’ve got to talk to Mugabe, The Times, 16 May. 
14  SPENCE, J. E. (2009) ‘’Point Man’ on Zimbabwe: South Africa’s Role in the Crisis’, The Round Table, 95: 384, 191-199.
15  HAMILL, J and HOFFMAN, J (2009) ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe’, 
The Round Table, 98: 402, 373-384.
16  EVANS, G. and NEWMAN, J. (1995) Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin, pp. 221.
17  The Daily Telegraph (2002) Mbeki attacks ‘racist’ Blair, 9 March.
18  THE ECONOMIST (2009) Zimbabwe: a unity government, at last, 14 February. 




2002 and 2004, ridden by poverty and inflation. In 
addition, the Zimbabwe state retained the monopoly 
of state power and its leaders the loyalty of armed 
forces, failing to label the country as a rogue state or 
into the obvious categories of statehood. Moreover, 
there was little chance in seeing Robert Mugabe in the 
mould of a de Clerk who recognized that the system 
existed had entered a cul- de- sac from which there 
must have been a decisive break.19 Mbeki adopted a 
kind of multilateralism that assumed that there must 
was some kind of common ground between the MDC 
and ZANU-PF, but this seems until now to be rather 
a dogmatic perversion and a panacea. 
The difficulty with this strategy of so called 
quiet diplomacy, was that Mbeki trying to stay in 
line with African colleagues, hostile to intervention 
strategies, risks disillusioning Western liberals who 
argued that this kind of solidarity between Mbeki 
and Mugabe profoundly harms South Africa’s profile 
as multilateralist, dedicated to the international 
institutions and human rights champion. Moreover, 
Mbeki’s failure to condemn authoritarianism in 
Zimbabwe discredited its own initiatives and made 
them appear hypocritical exercises in window dressing. 
  
Critical views on the legitimacy 
of multilateralism 
Critical commentators note that small and me-
dium sized states seek to enhance their international 
standing by assuming the role of mediators. Thus, it 
can be said that mediating saves them from having 
to take sides when pressed to do so in a conflict. In 
addition, Cooper states that the capacity of middle 
powers to increase their global influence and ac-
ceptance through the employment of their specific 
capabilities (Niche Diplomacy). Touval and Zartman 
note that mediation by medium sized states appears 
often to have been motivated by the desire to enhance 
their influence and prestige. For instance, Brazil to 
lead the UN Mission in Haiti in order to enhance its 
chances to become a permanent UNSC, while South 
Africa participated with 1500 troops each in the peace 
missions of DRC and Burundi. 
From this perspective middle powers such as Bra-
zil and South Africa could be attributed as functional 
leaders which are actually a specification of leader-
ship in certain areas. Thus, while regional leadership 
is more focused on comparative high military and 
economic capabilities, functional leadership requires 
expertise in a specific issue or area. 
On the other hand, neorealists consider inter-
national institutions to be merely puppets of the 
superpowers. From their perspective a multipolar 
system can be the result of the emergence of regional 
unipolarities against the superpower. Therefore, 
despite the fact that Brazil and South Africa enjoy 
increasing regional influence they are still located in 
the periphery of the current world system. Neoliberal 
institutionalism ascribes only limited importance to 
institutions in view of the tendencies to change within 
the international relations. Brazil and South Africa use 
global governance institutions and summits to build 
new coalitions to pursue common interests. They use 
international organizations as platforms to challenge 
the legitimacy of the present international order and 
to change the existing dominant norms. 
Nevertheless, the proliferation of the kind of 
partnerships like IBSA or bilateral arrangements in 
the context of Brazil-South Africa relationship has 
rendered the international architecture increasingly 
complex and unrepresentative, and raises questions 
regarding their legitimacy. Most of these state-to-
state arrangements seem to have no mechanisms 
of accountability or to keep any public records of 
their meetings and discussions. Another criticism as 
fomented by Forman and Segaar concerns the so-
called “forum-shopping” of these countries that can 
pick the mechanisms that fit better their individual 
political agenda.
Conclusion and Perspectives 
Brazil along with South Africa has been explicit in 
its intention to assume new responsibilities regarding 
regional security, the defense of democracy and the 
19  The Daily Telegraph (2008) Robert Mugabe says ‘‘only God’’ can remove him, 21 June.




consolidation in the regional integrations schemes. For 
Brazil as discussed above one of its main motivations 
has been the reform of the UN system, especially the 
reform of the Security Council. On the other hand 
South Africa has not been so vocal in promoting a 
larger UNSC. When it comes to the reform of the UN 
Brazil has invited South Africa to join the group of the 
countries lobbying for a permanent UNSC member-
ship. However, South Africa had to abide by the AU 
guidelines preventing it from fielding its candidacy. 
It’s evident though that the promotion of Brazil 
of closer South-South coalitions and especially with 
African Nations marks a turn in Brazilian foreign 
policy with regards to its intention to (re)build up 
the country’s African identity. However, the scramble 
for a concrete South-South cooperation could be at 
least a costly venture for Brazil partly due to the fact 
that the country must assume the consequences of 
collective action. 
Furthermore, on the one hand, Brazil’s intel-
lectual circles do not value military deterrence as a 
source of international prestige while on the other 
it will become more difficult for Brazil to sustain his 
position if it wishes to expand its responsibilities in 
regional and world security. The South African foreign 
policy under Mbeki has been highlighted a disjuncture 
between rhetoric and reality. South Africa’s global 
reputation has been tarnished by the Zimbabwe epi-
sodes. Pretoria’s global standing has suffered by its 
inability to act as a guarantor of democratic values 
within its own neighborhood. It remains to be seen 
the future of South Africa’s foreign policy under Jacob 
Zuma and how his going to handle all these foreign 
policy dilemmas. President Zuma has proved notably 
pragmatic caretaker of South Africa’s foreign policy 
and he has respected the country’s commitment to 
democratic institutions. 
However, the future of South Africa’s foreign af-
fairs seems less clear, like Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma 
aims to strengthen the African prestige and to keep 
the warm relations with the United States. Unlike, 
Mbeki, Zuma has been more vocal in his position 
regarding Zimbabwe and the human rights viola-
tions. Brazil face major challenges ahead, the Lula 
administration came to office strongly committed 
to the idea of change in the domestic front and it 
raised high expectations in terms of what it could 
achieve through multilateral institutions. Finally, the 
expectations are raised for the future of the Brazil’s 
Presidential politics since President Lula has identified 
Dilma Rouseff his chief of staff as his preferred suc-
cessor for the forthcoming elections.
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Resumo: This article will examine two of the world’s 
emerging middle powers Brazil and South Africa, the 
rise and promulgation of their cooperative strategies to 
reform institutions such as the United Nations Security 
Council. The article tries to examine the instrumental 
nature of South African and Brazilian foreign policy 
within the framework of both countries’ commitment 
to multilateralism and if this has been rising as 
part of a new form of shallow multilateralism or a 
regenerated regionalism of the South. Moreover, with 
regards to recent crises in Honduras and Zimbabwe, 
we will try to offer a critical evaluation of both 
countries global standing and their effort to promote 
democratic values in regional and sub-regional levels.
Abstract: This article will examine two of the world’s 
emerging middle powers Brazil and South Africa, the 
rise and promulgation of their cooperative strategies to 
reform institutions such as the United Nations Security 
Council. The article tries to examine the instrumental 
nature of South African and Brazilian foreign policy 
within the framework of both countries’ commitment 
to multilateralism and if this has been rising as part of 
a new form of shallow multilateralism or a regenerated 
regionalism of the South. Moreover, with regards to 
recent crises in Honduras and Zimbabwe, we will try 
to offer a critical evaluation of both countries global 
standing and their effort to promote democratic values 
in regional and sub-regional levels.
Palavras-chave: Brasil; África do Sul; Multilateralismo; 
Ordem Mundial; Cooperação Sul-Sul
Key words: Brazil; South Africa; Multilateralism; 
World Order; South-South Cooperation
